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THE INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND POLICY CENTER (IATPC)
The International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center (IATPC) was established in 1990 in the Institute of Food and Agriculture Sciences (IFAS) at the University of Florida (UF). The mission of the Center is to conduct a multi-disciplinary research, education and outreach program with a major focus on issues that influence competitiveness of specialty crop agriculture in support of consumers, industry, resource owners and policy makers. The Center facilitates collaborative research, education and outreach programs across colleges of the university, with other universities and with state, national and international organizations. The Center's objectives are to:
• Serve as the University-wide focal point for research on international trade, domestic and foreign legal and policy issues influencing specialty crop agriculture.
• Support initiatives that enable a better understanding of state, U.S. and international policy issues impacting the competitiveness of specialty crops locally, nationally, and internationally.
• Serve as a nation-wide resource for research on public policy issues concerning specialty crops.
• Disseminate research results to, and interact with, policymakers; research, business, industry, and resource groups; and state, federal, and international agencies to facilitate the policy debate on specialty crop issues.
Introduction
The incidence of foodborne diseases has dramatically increased in the past fifteen years in Juxtaposed against the emotional intensity that often surrounds health-related issues and the sometimes extreme measures that have been implemented to deal with foodborne diseases in particular, is a relatively scant literature analyzing the economics of trade policy in risky foodproducts. Many questions remain unanswered. From an economic welfare perspective, are trade embargoes rational when there is a food safety concern? Perhaps under some circumstances but not others? What are the welfare effects of policies such as COOL? Should a COOL be augmented by traditional protectionist trade policy instruments (e.g., tariffs)?
Product safety, and in particular food safety, issues have been analyzed theoretically and empirically, but primarily in the context of closed-economy, partial-equilibrium models. 1 In the international context, there are three related literatures. First, considerable attention has been
given to product quality and government intervention to help exporters overcome informational barriers that impede foreign market entry (in particular, adverse country-of-origin reputations).
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While this set of studies and the current one each embodies a type of endogenous quality determination, the nature and consequences of product quality differences, key decision-making units, international trade context, and pertinent policy analyses differ substantially. Second, consumer inability to distinguish safe and unsafe products in the marketplace resembles consumer inability to distinguish goods by production process (eco-friendly, sweatshop, etc.) which, if known, would affect willingness to pay. 4 Since welfare analyses of trade policy in the latter context lack explicit representation of how production process affects consumer utility, it is difficult to directly compare these studies with the present model. In addition, "labeling" in this literature is standard-conforming certification, a process that allows the consumer to definitively separate products of different "quality" in the marketplace. In contrast, in the current model, risk of purchasing and consuming an unsafe product cannot be 1 See, for instance, Oi (1973) , Epple and Raviv (1978) , Spence (1977) , Shapiro (1983) , Daughety and Reinganum (1995) , and Boom (1998) for theoretical analyses on product safety, among many others. For the impact of food safety on meat demand and for a partial review of empirical studies on food safety, see Piggott and Marsh (2004) . For extensive theoretical analysis in a domestic context, see Fulton and Giannakas (2004) and references therein. 2 See Grossman and Horn (1988) , Bagwell and Staiger (1989) , Falvey (1989) , Bagwell (1991) , Raff and Kim (1999), and Chisik (2003) among many others. 3 An interesting extension of the present research would link to these previous analyses by incorporating the possibility of consumer misperceptions of the safety of a specific country's exports as a consequence of the publicized outbreak of a foodborne disease in that country. Depending upon the nature of the disease, and the feasibility of its plausible incorporation into the potential exporter's explicit choice between "high quality" and "low quality" production, the situation could have similarities to examples that motivate the analyses of country-of-origin reputations. 4 Haener and Luckert (1998) and Blend and Ravensway (1999) provide empirical evidence of consumer willingness to pay a "green premium." Theoretical foundations of the literature date from the classic Akerlof (1970) study of the "hidden quality" problem associated with lemons in the used car market. Recent work by Gaisford and Lau (2000) and Beaulieu and Gaisford (2002) While both ROO and COOL involve "country labeling," there are critical distinctions for policy analysis modeling. ROO impacts the consumer directly via price (higher or lower depending upon eligibility for tariff-free shipment). COOL, in contrast, directly influences consumer behavior by expanding information on product attributes he/she associates with expected product safety. Price consequences are only indirect, as the change in consumer information alters demand conditions. More basically, the unobservable product-quality differences inherent in a COOL analysis give rise to the possibility of different prices for domestic and foreign production that do not characterize homogeneous ROO markets.
This paper develops a partial equilibrium model to analyze the welfare effects of a COOL program in the presence of risky foods supplied by domestic and/or foreign producers under perfect competition. The theoretical model uses building blocks from the seminal study by Oi (1973) , who established that in the presence of insurance markets, the uncertainty associated with the risk of consuming an unsafe product is reflected in the risk-adjusted price (RAP) 6 .
Higher than the market price, the RAP includes the proportion of unsafe units in the parent product and expected damage costs of consuming those hazardous units. In this paper, we consider a product with an inherent health risk. The consumer knows with some exogenous probability (equal to the proportion of unsafe units) that the product is risky, but cannot determine whether the consumption of any particular unit will lead to adverse health outcomes.
The primary focus of the research is the welfare effects of international trade in such a product and international trade policies with regard to such a product, when safety varies by country of origin.
5 Krueger (1993 Krueger ( , 1997 , Lloyd (1993), Lopez-de-Silanes, Markusen and Rutherford (1996) , Rodriguez (2001) , Falvey and Reed (2002) . For a recent literature review see Krishna (2005) . 6 In this paper we use the terminology of risk-adjusted price instead of full price, because it is more self-explanatory. The full price concept was developed by Becker (1965) to analyze the ultimate consumption flow.
We first analyze the effects of product risk and severity of the disease (as measured by the per-unit opportunity cost plus monetary cost of illness) on social welfare for the autarky (closedeconomy) equilibrium. Because the presence of safety risk creates a difference between the consumer (RAP) and the producer (market) price, the market for a risky product might not exist (Proposition 1). As intuitively expected, an increase in the riskiness of the product, or in the cost of illness, leads to a decrease in social welfare (Proposition 2).
For a small country that imports a riskier product than it produces, movement from the autarky equilibrium to free-trade in the absence of a COOL program (i.e., un-COOL trade) leads to a decrease in the production of safer domestic units and to a decrease in producer surplus. The effect of un-COOL free trade on expected consumer surplus is ambiguous and the welfare ranking between un-COOL trade and autarky is also ambiguous (Proposition 3). This result is consistent with the theory of distortions (Bhagwati 1971) : Un-COOL trade involves an informational distortion associated with the inability of consumers to assign the correct risk level to domestic and foreign goods that leads to a pooling equilibrium and ambiguous gains from trade. This result allows for the possibility of welfare-enhancing import bans. Even in the case where an import ban does not dominate un-COOL free trade, some restriction of un-COOL trade is always welfare-enhancing.
We then analyze the effects of introducing a COOL program that permits the consumer to differentiate safer domestically produced goods and less safe imports. Equilibrium requires equalization of the RAPs between the domestic and foreign goods resulting in an increase in the price and quantity of the healthier domestic product and an increase in the producer surplus (Proposition 4). Simultaneously, the implementation of COOL leads to a decrease in aggregate safe quantities of the product consumed and a decline in the expected consumer surplus. COOL removes the informational distortion associated with differential risk levels and reestablishes the traditional gains from trade (Proposition 5): In the presence of COOL, more trade (caused by a reduction in a tariff) increases the welfare of a small country even if it imports riskier goods.
More COOL trade is better than less COOL trade and welfare under COOL trade exceeds that of autarky or un-COOL trade.
While no model can thoroughly address the multiplicity of issues regarding food safety and global commerce, the current theoretical model sheds some light on the efficacy of trade policies commonly proposed to deal with those issues. It is a first step in developing a rational approach to the economic cost-benefit analysis of COOL programs that several industrial countries, including the US, are considering implementing or have recently implemented.
Section 2 of the paper develops the model and studies the properties of the closedeconomy equilibrium. Section 3 introduces the economics of un-COOL free-trade, and derives its welfare implications, for a small country importing a riskier product than it produces domestically. Section 4 analyzes the economic effects of COOL trade. Conclusions are provided in the last section and some proofs are relegated to appendixes.
Closed-Economy Equilibrium
Consider an economy producing an unsafe (risky) good denoted by X and an outside composite safe good Y , which will be used as the numeraire. Assume that labor is the only factor of production, and that each unit of good Y requires one unit of labor, implying that wages are equal to unity. To focus on the analysis of product safety we assume that perfect competition prevails in all markets and consumers have identical preferences.
The risk associated with a purchase X of the unsafe good is captured by the assumption that it embodies a certain proportion, λ , of safe units, Z X λ = , and a remaining unsafe portion, An alternative interpretation of the risk embodied in X is as follows: Rather than an expected proportion, λ , of safe units in any purchase X and a resultant (1 ) λ − expected 7 In our formulation the probability of the adverse health outcome is treated as "objective" information. Thus, any consumer who faces the same problem will assign the same probability. One could introduce the case where λ depends on self-protection actions and on a set of information (i.e. past experience) that each consumer uses in forming risk perceptions. This is an interesting generalization that is left for future research. Notice, though that any valuation of a public policy change should be based on objective risks.
proportion of unsafe units, the consumer making a purchase of X faces an exogenous probability (1 ) λ − the purchase will make him/her ill. Concomitantly, with probability λ , the purchase can be expected to be consumed without adverse health consequences. If a particular expenditure on X turns out to be a "bad lot," then the associated cost of illness is proportional to the volume of X purchased and consumed. Both interpretations yield the same key relationships that are used in the subsequent model analysis, but formal presentation is restricted to the first interpretation.
We postulate the existence of a competitive health (medical) insurance market that provides insurance to all consumers in the market against the loss L caused by the consumption of the unsafe product. Loss L is given exogenously and captures the direct (i.e., medical treatment) costs and the indirect (i.e., lost wages) costs of illness per-unit of unsafe X consumed. Parameter L can be as large as the economic cost of life (as in the case of the "Mad Cow" disease) and in principle depends on the quality of the health system. Following the insurance literature, we further assume that the insurance offered to the consumers is full and actuarially fair in the sense that the insurance premium equals the expected value of the insurance claims. 8 In the case of eggs, one can measure the expected damage cost to the consumer using the cost of illness (COI) data available on the ERS website Foodborne Illness Cost Calculator (FCOI 2004) . The COI method includes both direct and indirect costs of an illness. In the case of Salmonella in eggs, the ERS website data imply that the average cost of illness is $2,126.
Assuming the representative consumer derives utility only from the safe units Z of product X and from the outside (safe) good Y ; and, following the standard approach to partialequilibrium analysis, suppose that the utility function is separable in X and Y
where ( ) u Z is an increasing and concave function of the safe quantity of the risky good X and indicates that the consumer does not receive any utility from the unsafe units X Z − 9 . In this formulation, the price of product Y is equal to unity (numeraire), while the market price of 8 The absence of an actuarially fair and full insurance complicates the analysis. See Oi (1973) and especially Epple and Raviv (1978) among others for more details on this issue. Oi (1973) adopts the assumption of full and actuarially fair insurance, while Epple and Raviv (1978) provide also results for the case of partial insurance. 9 The analysis can be generalized to the case of severe risky products that result in a negative utility level if one risky unit is consumed. This novel extension is beyond the scope of the present paper.
product X is denoted by P . Since Y enters the consumer's utility linearly, equation (1) allows us to focus on partial-equilibrium analysis, while the assumption of a single unsafe product will be relaxed in section 4 that analyzes the economic effects of COOL.
The above notation and assumptions imply the following maximization problem for the representative consumer. For a given amount of X purchased, only X λ will yield positive utility. Insuring against the expected cost of illness (or setting aside the funds to pay for it) requires expenditure of (1 )LX λ − . Assuming a total budget M , and a price P of X , the consumer's maximization problem is as follows:
The first-order condition for (2) can be written as ( )
where a prime superscript denotes a partial derivate and the argument in the left-hand side of (3) is equal to the amount of "safe" food consumed
). Concavity of ( ) . u guarantees that the second-order condition for (2) is satisfied.
Recalling that the consumer derives utility only from good Y and the safe units Z of product X , it is obvious from (3) that the solution to the utility maximization problem (2) is identical to maximizing
is the risk-adjusted price (RAP) of an unsafe good. In the presence of actuarially fair insurance, the economic interpretation of (4) is described elegantly by Oi (1973) 10 : P is the risk-adjusted price (expected cost) of obtaining a safe unit of a risky product, / P λ is the warranty price, and
is the actuarially fair insurance premium rate per "safe" unit.
We illustrate the relative magnitude of the RAP for the case of eggs embodying the risk of contracting Salmonella. Substituting the risk of becoming sick ( 
Substituting X Z λ = into the left-hand side of (3) yields the inverse market demand function of the risky good X , where the dependent variable is the market price (as opposed to the RAP):
Equation (5) yields the first result of our model which is stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: A market for an unsafe product does not exist if the following condition holds:
( ) 0 (1 ) 0 P u L λ λ ′ = − − ≤ , i.e.,
the vertical intercept of its market demand curve is non-positive.
The condition in proposition 1 defines a lower bound of product safety
which varies positively with L and negatively with the marginal utility of consuming the first safe unit of the good.
The supply side of the economy is modeled as follows: We assume that producers maximize profits with respect to a given market price P of the risky product X and that the output of good X supplied is given by
where and ( ) 0 S X P = for a non-negative price 0 P ≥ : The supply curve is upward sloping and has a non-negative vertical intercept. The assumption of a non-negative vertical intercept is not critical for the analysis. Implicit in (6) is the assumption that the supply of a risky good does not depend on the proportion of "safe" units, but simply on per unit market price of X .
11 For welfare analysis purposes, it is useful to invert (6) and define the inverse supply of a risky good X ( ) ( )
where 
The autarky (closed-economy) equilibrium condition requires equality between the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded for the tradeable good X :
Condition (8) determines the market equilibrium price A P (where subscript A denotes the autarky equilibrium) and the equilibrium quantity of X , A X . In addition, multiplying both sides of equation (8) 
which implies equality between the equilibrium level of safe units of good X produced and consumed. Having determined the producer price A P , one can calculate the consumer RAP, A P , directly by setting 
is the market demand curve for the risky good X , which is implicitly defined by equation (5). 12 The intersection of these two curves illustrates geometrically the solution of (8), which yields the closed-economy market-equilibrium price A P and quantity produced A X . Having determined the equilibrium quantity of the risky good produced A X , one can readily determine the equilibrium 11 One could introduce the assumption that the supply of a risky good is a decreasing function of λ and analyze the effects of policies that provide direct incentives to producers to increase the safety of their products. This generalization is beyond the scope of the present paper and constitutes an interesting topic for further research. 
Figure 1: Closed-Economy Equilibrium
The downward-slopped curve ( ) D Z P illustrates the demand curve for safe units Z as a function of the risk-adjusted price P (defined in equation (3)). Evaluating this inverse demand curve at the equilibrium level of safe units A Z yields the equilibrium RAP, A P , which exceeds the market price. Area (α) that is located below curve ( ) D Z P and above the equilibrium RAP, A P , is equal to the expected consumer surplus.
Area (β+γ), which is located below the market equilibrium price A P and above the supply curve ( ) S X P , measures producer surplus. In our analysis producer surplus captures the rents to specific factors (or industry profits) associated with the supply of A X risky units, given our assumption that consumers bear all the risks and so producers are not concerned with the distinction between safe and unsafe units. Consequently, the closed-economy equilibrium level of social welfare is measured by area (α+β+γ). This geometric property will be utilized later in the welfare analysis of various public policies. We need to emphasize that the use of this
standard measure of producer surplus implies that producers are not liable for the production of unsafe units and our analysis abstracts from moral hazard and principal-agent considerations associated with the production of unsafe products. These issues have been analyzed in closed economy models and constitute an important direction for future research.
13
It is apparent from Fig. 1 that, in the presence of foodborne risk, the closed-economy equilibrium involves two distinct types of welfare distortions. First, consumer behavior depends on the RAP, which exceeds the market price. This discrepancy between the two prices is similar to the welfare effects of a specific tax incidence that reduces total welfare. Second, unlike a tax incidence, in the present model the "tax revenue" is proportional to the value of the unsafe units which does not yield any utility to the consumer. In other words, the corresponding "tax revenue" is not a transfer but a pure welfare loss associated with the production and consumption of unsafe units. This welfare loss is measured by the area Fig. 1 and depends on the market quantity of Z, the proportion of unsafe units, and the per-unit cost of illness.
In addition, for any given parameters of the model and in the presence of perfect competition, the market solution maximizes social welfare (defined as the sum of expected consumer plus producer surplus). In other words, unless the social planner can alter the risk parameter λ (perhaps though testing) or the per-unit cost of illness L (through health care reforms or development of better treatments), the market solution coincides with the maximization of social welfare. To establish this property, denote with ( ) C X the aggregate social (and private) costs of producing X units of the risky good. Assuming a total budget of M , the social planner derives utility from the amount of safe units consumed Z X λ = and incurs two types of costs, health insurance costs (1 )LX λ − and production costs ( ) C X . Hence, the social planner's problem is
which yields the first-order condition
In the competitive market equilibrium,
Comparing (10) with (3) yields the desired result, namely that, under consumer liability and full insurance, the market equilibrium maximizes the level of national welfare.
Differentiating the equilibrium conditions (8) and/or (9) totally, one can derive the comparative statics properties of the closed-economy equilibrium.
Proposition 2:
The closed-economy equilibrium is characterized by the following properties:
(a) An increase in per-unit damage cost L ↑ shifts the market demand curve in Fig. 1 , 
) with respect to λ and simplify using (10) to verify 0 dW dλ > . For (c), substitute X λ for Z in (10) and then differentiate totally to determine dX dλ whose sign depends upon the sign of
. Use (5) differentiated with respect to X ( λ fixed) to establish (c). For the rest of the analysis we assume 2.c holds.
These results are consistent with the empirical evidence that consumer demand is susceptible to any new information concerning the way consumers perceive objective (or subjective) threats to food safety as measured by the parameters λ and L . For instance, according to Piggott and Marsh (2004) the public will generally respond to a foodborne outbreak by decreasing its consumption, at least in the short run. Moreover, if the food-safety problem is recurring, it can result in an inward shift of consumer demand for a specific good. In the case of the 1996 outbreak of BSE ("Mad Cow" disease) in the United Kingdom, both the product risk
(1-λ ) and loss L (equal to the statistical value of life) were large and caused a substantial decline in the demand for beef. However, if the product risk (1-λ ) is very small, then even for large L the difference between the RAP and the market price will be small and the demand for a risky product will be determined by its market price. This is consistent with the findings of a report by the Foreign Agricultural Service of the USDA (FAS 1998), which indicated that while E.U. consumers are concerned with food safety, price of beef is also important in deciding whether or not to purchase beef. That is, if the price of beef is low enough, consumers may buy it despite any remaining concerns over BSE.
Un-COOL Free Trade
Having established the welfare properties and comparative statics of the closed economy equilibrium, we now analyze the benchmark free-trade equilibrium in the absence of country-oforigin labeling (COOL). We assume that the consumer cannot distinguish imports and domestic goods in the marketplace although he/she knows all the parameters of the model and the market equilibrium values of the relevant endogenous variables. Consequently, this section analyzes the pooling equilibrium associated with an informational distortion: The inability of the domestic consumer to differentiate between imports and domestic products. To facilitate the economic intuition and the clarity of the geometric analysis, we will illustrate the free-trade equilibrium for the case of a country that imports an unsafe good at a fixed international market price * P (the small-country case). This implies that the home country faces a horizontal supply curve of imports at the international market price * P and each unit of imports carries a risk of becoming ill equal to 1 * λ − .
14 Denote with T X the market quantity of the domestic risky product and with * T X the corresponding quantity of risky imports coming from the rest of the world, where subscript T will be used to indicate function and variables associated with the (free) trade equilibrium. Let λ λ λ λ < < < , which implies markets exist for each of the two products and home produces a safer product than the rest of the world. Assume finally that damage costs L associated with consumption of unsafe domestic and imported goods are equal-i.e., the illness imports carry is the same as that of domestic production.
Since consumers cannot distinguish between the two risky goods, free-trade will result in equalization of the domestic and world prices, i.e., * P P = . The market quantity supplied will be
, where the domestic quantity supplied T X is given by ( ) 
where * P is the common market price, ˆT P is the free-trade risk-adjusted price,
is the free-trade consumption safety level, and * * /( *)
is the consumption share of imports. Un-COOL free-trade yields a common market price * P and a common RAP given by 
and, for clarity of exposition, we replicate equation (12) below
Because the domestic quantity of safe units 
Imports and Food Safety
As the quantity of safe imports increases the marginal utility declines, and the denominator of (13) decreases. Equation (14) Note that if * A P P ≥ , the graph of equation (13) in Fig. 2 lies above that of equation (14) for non-zero * T Z and the free-trade equilibrium reduces to the autarky equilibrium. If (14) in Fig. 2 is undefined at Z*=0 and otherwise horizontal at T λ = * λ . The freetrade equilibrium reduces to one of solely purchasing imports. We abstract from these uninteresting degenerative equilibria by assuming: Fig. 3 illustrates the welfare effects of unsafe food imports and the autarky welfare level. It does this by superimposing on the closed-economy equilibrium in Fig. 1 , the market supply of imports, which is a horizontal line intersecting the vertical axis at * P . imports. Under un-COOL free trade, domestic producers face a lower price and reduce the quantity of unsafe and safe food produced, and therefore the producer surplus is equal to area (β).
The move from autarky to free trade results in a decline in the producer surplus which equals area (γ) in Fig. 3 .
The effects of un-COOL free trade on the expected consumer surplus (and the total welfare) are in general ambiguous. In order to calculate the RAP associated with the free-trade equilibrium, one has to add the safe quantity embodied in imports * T Z , which is determined in general, the consumer welfare ranking between autarky and free-trade is ambiguous and depends on the ranking of the RAPs under the two regimes. The ranking is unclear because the move from autarky to free trade lowers price, but increases risk of illness. Fig. 3 illustrates a case in which the move from autarky to un-COOL free trade leaves the economy's welfare unchanged: Un-COOL free-trade reduces the market price from A P to * P and reduces the producer surplus by area (γ). This reduction in welfare is the same as the increase in expected consumer surplus measured by area (δ), caused by a reduction in the RAP from A P to ˆT P . Thus, even if imports are more risky than domestic products, the economy is indifferent between imposing an import ban and engaging in free trade. Of course, in this case consumers like free trade more than the import ban (free trade results in higher consumer surplus than autarky), while producers would advocate an import ban based on the effects of trade on producer surplus. It is straightforward to show the existence of cases for welfare improving import bans. For example, starting at an equilibrium of indifference between a ban and free trade, a decline in import safety * λ does not affect the graph of equation (13) in Fig. 2 , but rotates clockwise from its intercept the graph of equation (14) and results in a lesser safe quantity of imports * T Z , for any given market price * P . This implies that the total safe quantity available to consumers * T T Z Z + declines in Fig. 3 , and the expected consumer surplus under free un-COOL trade falls. Since the expected producer surplus depends on the market price * P , a reduction in * λ leaves this component of national welfare unaffected. Consequently, the expected gain from trade measured by area (δ-γ) is negative and an import ban improves welfare.
One can readily construct other scenarios that justify the ban of unsafe imports based on other parameter changes.
Note finally that even if free trade is preferred to a ban, there always exists a restriction of trade that improves welfare-i.e., free un-COOL trade is never welfare maximizing for a small Consequently, consumers over-consume Z in the free-trade equilibrium, setting up the conditions for welfare-enhancing trade restrictions.
COOL Trade
We ( )
where C P denotes the producer price of domestically produced X , * P the producer price of imports and "^" indicates associated RAP. Under COOL trade, the consumer buys the product with the lower risk-adjusted price, since a safe unit gives the consumer the same utility, whether it is produced domestically or imported. The different country-specific health risks generate perceived quality differences that are reflected in different market prices. Coexistence of both goods in the market requires that consumers derive the same marginal utility from the two risky products (that is, the consumer must be indifferent between consuming a safe unit of the domestic good and a safe unit of the imported good). This implies that the introduction of COOL results in equalization of RAP between the domestic and imported product. Formally, equations (16) and (17) imply that
which determines C P and equilibrium RAPs, ˆˆ*
Unlike the equilibrium analyzed in the previous section, COOL trade introduces a market price differential in favor of the safer product. Solving equation (18) for the producer price of the domestically produced good yields
According to equation (19), the good with the lower safety risk (in this case the domestic product since * λ λ > by assumption) commands a higher market price at equilibrium because the consumer perceives it as a higher quality (healthier) good. Substituting (19) into the domestic supply of the risky good yields the equilibrium safe domestic quantity produced
Since the introduction of COOL raises the market price of the domestic product relative to the domestic price of imports ( * C P P > ), the introduction of COOL generates a higher producer surplus compared to the free-trade equilibrium without COOL. Therefore, abstracting from implementation costs, the introduction of COOL will be supported by producers of domestic goods that are safer than imported ones.
COOL effects on expected consumer surplus depend on COOL effects on the RAP. From (11) and (17) 
The total amount of safe quantity consumed under COOL free trade is strictly less than the corresponding quantity under un-COOL free trade, i.e. * *
follows from the concavity of the consumer's utility function. The result implies that, starting at the un-COOL free-trade equilibrium, the introduction of COOL reduces the expected consumer surplus, which is an increasing function of the aggregate safe quantity consumed. Since the consumption of the safer domestic good increases with the introduction of COOL, (i.e., We are now in a position to establish the optimality of COOL. With a price * P for imports, * X , and P for domestically produced X , d X , and a domestic cost of producing d X ,
C X , the level of national welfare in general is given by:
An interior maximum for W ( 0, * 0
( )
The concavity of u and 0 > ′ ′ C assure second order conditions are satisfied. Given that both C′ and u′ are monotonic, if an interior maximum exists, it is unique. Since
, ( 1 6 ) a n d (17) imply an interior COOL equilibrium is this unique maximum. Note that un-COOL trade can never maximize welfare since joint satisfaction of (23) and (24) 
i.e., at the autarky solution, the marginal utility of an additional unit of Z is less than the RAP of buying it as an import and hence, there is no market for imports. In this situation, clearly the equivalent autarky and corner COOL equilbria dominate the un-COOL trade equibrium because no interior maximum exists. Hence, welfare under a COOL regime always exceeds that of un-COOL trade and it exceeds that of autarky except in cases the two are equivalent.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to establish that any restriction of COOL trade reduces welfare 16 . If a non-prohibitive specific tariff, t , is imposed on imports, the COOL equilibrium can be determined as above by replacing * P by * P t + . Equations (17), (19) and (20) .
Because the safe quantities of domestic and imported products are proportional to C X and * C X , an increase in protection increases C Z and reduces * C Z . As a result, protection has the standard effects of increasing the domestic production and reducing the level of imports.
For any given budget M , the social planner derives utility from the safe units consumed 
Differentiating the above expression with respect to the specific tariff yields:
Equation (16) and the property ( )
imply that, under COOL, the term in the curly bracket of (27) is zero. From (17), the expression in the square bracket is equal to the value of the specific tariff. Therefore, taking into account the above analysis and using (26) Proposition 5 is consistent with the theory of trade distortions applied to this particular informational welfare distortion. The introduction of a COOL policy removes this distortion and reestablishes the traditional optimality of trade which asserts that more trade is better than less trade for a country that cannot change the terms-of-trade. This proposition also implies that if the costs of maintaining a COOL policy are unaffected by changes in the level of protection, more COOL trade is better even if a small country imports riskier goods. COOL seems to be the best policy instrument to offer protection from unsafe imports, assuming of course that the consumer is as informed as the policy makers about the potential risk of imports.
Concluding Remarks
The present study developed a small open-economy partial-equilibrium model in which the small country produces an unsafe product and imports another riskier product under conditions of perfect competition. Product risk was modeled as the exogenous proportion of units of the parent good that lead to adverse health outcomes. Consumers were assumed to know this proportion, but they could not distinguish whether a particular unit of the good was safe or unsafe.
The model was used to analyze three cases. The first was the closed-economy equilibrium, the second a free-trade regime without country-of-origin labeling (COOL), and the third was a free-trade regime coupled with a COOL program.
We established that the competitive equilibrium maximized social welfare for the closed economy situation where social welfare is measured by the sum of expected consumer and producer surplus. The presence of insurable risk creates a wedge between the producer and consumer price that depends positively on the per-unit cost of becoming ill and on the proportion of unsafe units embodied in the risky product. In the absence of a COOL program, the opening of trade with another country that produces a riskier good at a lower price results in a reduction in expected producer surplus and an ambiguous effect on expected consumer surplus. An Of course the model's properties and results depend on several assumptions. We have assumed that the consumers are fully informed about the safety risk of the two products.
However, consumers could form a subjective estimate of the risk of the product, which may be higher or lower than the objective risk assumed in this paper. We have also abstracted from analyzing the more realistic case of multiple import suppliers and multiple levels of countryspecific risky products. We have also avoided incorporating the effects of costs associated with implementation and maintenance of national COOL programs and the introduction of costly testing and disposal of unsafe units. Further, we have assumed that a competitive insurance market exists that offers an actuarially fair insurance premium to the consumers in order to cover the damages from consumption of unsafe goods. Finally we have analyzed the case of full consumer liability and abstracted from principal-agent and moral hazard issues associated with producer incentives. All these important topics represent very fruitful avenues for future research some of which constitute work in progress by the authors. We complete the paper by addressing the title question for the demanding reader:
How cool is COOL trade? Pretty cool indeed! Appendix A At any unrestricted un-COOL trade equilibrium, there always exists a trade restriction that improves welfare.
A1. Tariff
Welfare as a function of the specific tariff t , ( ) W t , is given for the un-COOL case by ( )
Totally differentiating this expression with respect to tariff yields
With un-COOL trade and a specific tariff, t , on imports (13) is modified by replacing * P by * P t + and (14) is unchanged except for recognition that T Z is a function of ( * P t + ). For given * T Z , the shifts in equations (13) and (14) in Figure 2 as a function of t are readily determined by differentiation to both be upward, establishing that
The sign of * T dZ dt cannot be definitively established. However, re-writing (14) in terms of X , * * *
it is straightforward to show (A2), (A3) and * λ λ > , imply the elasticity of T X with respect to t exceeds the elasticity of * T X with respect to t or:
From (11), * T λ λ λ < < , and * ) ( P X C T = ′ at 0 t = , it follows at an un-COOL equilibrium with 0 t = , the term in curly brackets in (A1) is strictly positive while the term in square brackets is strictly negative. Since ( ) *
, then it follows directly from the signs of the terms in brackets of (A1) that
Under the assumption 0 * > dt dX T , the sign of the right-hand side of (A5) is determined by the sign of the term the square brackets. The latter is the same as the sign of
Given the strict inequality of (A5) it follows that 0 0 t dW dt = > and imposition of a tariff improves welfare.
Although there is at least a marginal tariff that unambiguously improves welfare, it is questionable whether or not the tariff constitutes a "trade restriction" in the case of 0 * > dt dX T - i.e., the tariff actually increases imports. This outcome can occur because the increase in safety
, increases demand for all X (including imports which are indistinguishable from domestic production) and the positive safety effect of a tariff can offset the negative price effect of the tariff. Note that given an equilibrium with 0 t > , it does not necessarily follow that 0 > dt dW . In this case, the term in curly brackets in (A1) remains unambiguously positive, but the term in square brackets is not unambiguously negative since it includes the positive value of the specific tariff.
A2. Quota
In contrast to a tariff that can actually raise imports, imposition of a quota on * X at an unrestricted un-COOL trade equilibrium is an unambiguous trade restriction. Hence, we now show that at any unrestricted un-COOL trade equilibrium, there exists a quota on * X that reduces imports and raises welfare. As noted in the text, total Z purchased in the COOL equilibrium is less than Z purchased in the un-COOL equilibrium.
Consider a quota in the latter that restricts * Z to * * *
It is assumed the quota amount of * X , * / * Z λ is purchased at world price * P , mixed with domestic production and then sold to consumers. Price ( q P ) of both imported X and domestic X ( q X ), is determined by supply equals demand given the quota and domestic production determined byP X C = ′ ) (
. Profit on the quota purchase and resale ( *) * q P P X − is returned to the consumer. The general expression for welfare given in (22) is unaffected. To distinguish pooled λ in general from its specific value of T λ in the unrestricted un-COOL equilibrium, define: * * * * * 
